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Abstract
I consider a developer creating a new blockchain-based decentralized digital platform. Users can
perform exchanges on the decentralized digital platform only by using a specific crypto-token. The
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Offering (ICO) to raise funds. Novel with respect to the literature, the developer can also sell tokens
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post-ICO period there is a positive probability that the developer sells all of his tokens on the
market and, as a consequence, no development occurs. If the developer does not need to raise funds
via an ICO, the equilibrium will nonetheless be inefficient because the developer’s payoff depends
on the surplus generated by the decentralized digital platform in a given period (when he expects
to sell his tokens). He therefore fails to internalize that the decentralized digital platform will be
used (and generate surplus) over multiple periods.
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1 Introduction
The astonishing rise of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) brought blockchain-based crypto-tokens
to the forefront of the policy, academic, and regulatory debate. An ICO is a form or crowd-
funding in which startups (or loose groups of developers) raise capital by selling crypto-
tokens. The first notable ICO was that of Ethereum in 2014, raising USD 2.3 million in
approximately 12 hours. ICO activity exploded in 2017 and, especially, in 2018, with ICOs
raising more that USD 6 billion in a single month (July 2018, from Lyandres, Palazzo, and
Rabetti, 2018, see Figure 1). For comparison, in 2016 total Venture Capital investment in
Europe was USD 4.7 billion (OECD, 2017).
These extraordinary events partially obscured a crucial fact: that in the vast majority
of cases, teams going through an ICO plan to profit from their work by selling more tokens
at a later stage. That is, the sale of tokens constitutes not only an innovative fundraising
mechanism, but also a novel way to profit from software development. I call the sale of
tokens as a mean to earn profits seigniorage.1 Seigniorage is the dominant business model in
the blockchain sector, covering the largest ICOs to date and approximately 90% of the total
crypto-market.2
To illustrate how seigniorage works, consider a population of agents who wish to ex-
change either a good or a service, but are prevented from doing so by the lack of required
infrastructure. If this exchange can occur in electronic form, then the missing infrastructure
may be a protocol, that is, the technical specifications governing the communication between
machines. Suppose a developer creates the missing protocol and with it a decentralized digi-
tal platform (i.e., the peer-to-peer network of the users of the protocol). This developer can
profit from his innovation by simultaneously creating a token, and by establishing that all
exchanges that occur on the decentralized digital platform must use this token. The token
is therefore the internal currency of the platform.3 The developer owns the initial stock of
tokens so that, if the decentralized digital platform is successful, there will be a positive
demand for tokens, a positive price for tokens and positive profits earned by the developer.
1 Seigniorage is defined as the profits earned by issuing currency, and is a well known concept from
monetary economics. What is novel here is that, thanks to blockchain technology, it can be used to create
incentives for innovation.
2 At the time of writing, among the top-30 tokens by market capitaliztion, 22 are tokens associated with
open-source blockchain-based decentralized digital platforms earning profits via seignorage. These 28 tokens
represent approximately 90% of the total crypto-market (data from www.coinmarketcap.com).
3 Prices could be expressed in fiat currency (that is, in some numeraire). The important point is that they
need to be settled using the token.
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Fig. 1: From Lyandres, Palazzo, and Rabetti (2018) page 35: “This figure reports monthly
values of the number of ICOs that are able to raise funds (dashed blue line, left axis)
and the total amount raised across all ICOs each month (billions of dollars, right
axis). The solid red line excludes the EOS ICO in June 2018, while the dotted red
line includes it. Monthly observations go from August 2015 to August 2019. The
observations reported for the month of August 2015 group all ICOs up to August
2015.”.
Blockchain enables seigniorage because it allows the developer to commit to a given
supply of tokens. This is because the rules determining whether (and how) the supply of
tokens increases over time can initially be specified within the protocol (see Section 2.1 for
additional details on blockchain). If the protocol is open source—that is, its source code is
publicly available—this commitment is credible because anybody can verify the monetary
policy specified by the protocol. Of course, this type of commitment could be achieved by
other means, for example by complex institutional design (e.g., creating a “central bank”) or
by building reputation over time. But these alternatives are very expensive and not widely
available.4 Blockchain instead generates commitment by computer code. Note, however,
that open-source software (including blockchain-based protocols) must be free to use.5 This
4 As a consequence, the only notable example of non-blockchain electronic currency that is freely ex-
changeable with dollars is the Linden Dollar (the currency of the game Second Life). Other non-blockchain
electronic currencies are those of online games like World of Warcraft. These currencies cannot be freely
exchanged with dollars.
5 This follows from Bertrand competition: if an open-source software is not free, a competitor or a group
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implies that seigniorage is incompatible with traditional pricing.
I build a model in which a developer can sell tokens both to raise funds and to then profit
from his/her work. More precisely, in every period, a developer exerts effort and invests in
the development of a blockchain-based decentralized digital platform. Initially, the developer
owns the entire stock of tokens, and can sell some to investors via an Initial Coin Offering
(ICO), modeled as an auction. Subsequently, in every period, he can sell (or buy) tokens
on a frictionless market for tokens in which investors are active.6 The developer can use the
proceedings of the sale of tokens to either invest in the development of the platform or to
consume.
The first result is that, if investors are price takers, then in any post-ICO period there
is an anti-coordination problem. If investors expect the developer to develop the software
in the future, this expectation should be priced into the token’s current price. But if this
is the case, then the developer is strictly better off by selling all of his tokens, which allows
him to “cash in” on future developments without doing any work. On the other hand, if
investors expect no development to occur, the price of the token will be low. The developer
should hold onto as many tokens as possible, exert effort and invest in the development of the
platform, so to increase the future price of the token. In every post-ICO period, therefore,
the equilibrium is in mixed strategy: the price of the token is such that the developer is
indifferent between selling all of his tokens (and therefore not developing the platform) or
keeping a strictly positive amount of tokens (and therefore continuing the development of
the platform). The developer randomizes between these two options, in a way that leaves
investors indifferent between purchasing tokens in any given period.
When choosing whether and when to hold an ICO, the developer is therefore facing a
tradeoff. If he holds an ICO, in every subsequent period he may sell all of his tokens and
not develop the platform. Postponing the ICO, therefore, prevents the creation of a market
for tokens and works as a commitment device, because the developer will hold all of his
tokens for certain and set the corresponding level of effort and investment. However, if the
developer does not sell tokens at ICO, he may lack the funds to invest in the development of
the platform. As a consequence, the developer never wants to hold an ICO if his own assets
of users could, at zero cost, launch an exact replica of the same software having lower or zero prices.
6 This feature of the model is justified by the observation that, absent a market for tokens, users could not
use the platform. This is one of the distinguishing features of tokens relative to other forms of financing, such
as, for example, equity. In a traditional business financed via equity, instead, trading equities can be made
more or less liquid for the company founders and managers (for example via provisions in the shareholders
agreement), independently from the ability of consumers to use the product.
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are sufficient to finance the optimum level of investment, but may hold the ICO otherwise.
The model delivers two main insights. The first one is that, as with other forms of
external financing, selling some tokens at ICO weakens the developer’s future incentives to
develop the platform, and therefore leads to inefficiencies. The interesting part of this result
is the specific form of this inefficiency: in every period after the ICO the developer may sell
all his tokens and stop the development of the platform. The second insight is more subtle
but more interesting. Even assuming that the developer can develop the decentralized digital
platform using exclusively his own funds (so that the first source of inefficiency is absent),
his level of effort and investment are set so as to maximize the value of his stock of tokens.
This value depends on the volume of the transaction occurring on the platform during a
given period of time.7 Instead, in the first best, effort and investment should be set so as to
maximize the present discounted value of the surplus generated by the platform. That is, the
fact that the platform will be used and generate surplus over multiple periods is completely
disregarded by the developer.
Interestingly, the level of effort and investment set by the developer may be above or
below their first best levels. This will be determined by a parameter in the model measuring
the speculative demand for tokens—that is, the investors’ demand for tokens driven by the
expectation that other investors will demand tokens in the future. The speculative demand
determines the sensitivity of the price of tokens to changes in the developer’s effort and
investment, which therefore will be higher when speculation is more intense. Back-of-the
envelope calculations using data from Ethereum suggest that the equilibrium level of effort
and investment is above the welfare-maximizing level. This is due to the fact that, at
present, only a small fraction of tokens is used by users, with the vast majority being held
by investors.8
The model delivers a number of other interesting results. For example, post-ICO there
may be multiple equilibria. Because of a cash constraint, the developer cannot invest in the
development of the platform more than his assets. It follows that the developer may sell
some of his tokens, as a way of accumulating assets to finance the future development of the
7 This will result from an application of the equation of exchange, usually employed to link a country’s
price level, real GDP, money supply and velocity of money.
8 This result is subject to many caveats. The main one is that over- or under-provision of effort and
investment should emerge as a function of the fraction of tokens held by investors in the long run, that
is, when the software is mature and all major developments stop. Arguably, no blockchain project has yet
reached this stage. I will argue that, at present, the best candidate for such an analysis is Ethereum, because
among the oldest and better established projects, it is the one in which it is easier to identify the fraction of
tokens used vs kept by investors.
2 Background and relevant literature 6
platform. The number of tokens that the developer needs to sell in order to finance future
investments depends on the current price for tokens, therefore generating a coordination
problem. If the price is high, the developer needs to sell fewer tokens, and his incentives to
invest and develop the software in the future are high. This, in turn, justifies the high price
for tokens today. If instead the price today is low, in order to finance future development,
the developer needs to sell more tokens. But then his incentives to develop the software will
be low, which justifies the fact that the price is low today. Therefore, post-ICO there could
be multiple mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section provides the reader
with the necessary background information on blockchain, ICOs and seigniorage, and also
discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 presents a model of seigniorage. Section 4 solves
for its equilibrium. Section 5 illustrates the first best of the model and compares it to its
equilibrium. Section 6 discusses some extensions to the model, such as the possibility of
using monopoly pricing (instead of seigniorage) and the possibility of raising funds from a
Venture Capitalists (instead of via an ICO). Section 7 concludes. Unless otherwise noted,
all proofs and mathematical derivations missing from the text are in the Appendix.
2 Background and relevant literature
2.1 Blockchain-based decentralized digital platforms and
seigniorage
In his seminal paper, Nakamoto (2008) introduced two innovations. The first one is Bit-
coin, a new digital currency. The second, more important, is the bitcoin protocol, an open-
source software allowing a network of anonymous, selfish participant to maintain a record
of Bitcoin transactions. Because these transactions are grouped into “blocks” that are then
“chained” (i.e., linked) together to form an immutable history, this technology became known
as blockchain. Importantly, the bitcoin protocol also regulates the total number of bitcoins
in every period, which is set to increase over time at a decreasing rate so to never exceed 21
millions. At the onset of Bitcoin (in early 2009), Nakamoto created and kept to himself ap-
9 Clearly, if there are network effects, then there is an additional coordination problem: for a given sequence
of effort and investment by the developer, there could be both a “high adoption” and a “low adoption”
equilibrium. The novelty here is that, for a given adoption equilibrium, there are multiple equilibrium
sequences of effort and investment arising from a coordination problem between investors and the developer.
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proximately 1 million Bitcoin, before ceasing to contribute to the development of the Bitcoin
protocol in mid-2010.
Shortly after the introduction of Bitcoin, it became apparent that blockchain can be
used to maintain any type of record, not only financial records. It therefore quickly became
the technological foundation of various other decentralized digital platform. In addition to
several cryptocurrencies (such as Monero, ZCash, Litecoin), there are now several decen-
tralized computing platforms that can run any application or software (see Ethereum, EOS,
Cardano, NEO);10 decentralized platforms for real-time gross settlement (see Ripple, Stel-
lar); decentralized marketplaces for storage and hosting of files (see SIA, Filecoin, Storj),
for renting in/out CPU cycles (see Golem), for event or concert tickets (see Aventus), for
e-books (see Publica); decentralized prediction markets (see Augur, Gnosis); decentralized
financial exchanges (see 0xproject); and many more.
As already discussed, each platform must be used in conjunction with a specific token.
In case of decentralized marketplaces, the token is typically the internal currency the mar-
ketplace. Similarly, within decentralized computing platforms (e.g., Ethereum), the protocol
native token (e.g., Ether) must be used to pay miners or validators for executing some piece
of software (called smart contracts). In the case of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, people
who need to exchange Bitcoins reward those who process these transactions (called, again,
miners) in two ways. One is direct: the sender can directly pay some Bitcoins to the miner
to process his transaction faster. The second is indirect: the network awards miners with
new bitcoins for their work. Because of its effect on the price, this increase in the sup-
ply of bitcoins amounts to a transfer from the holders of bitcoins to the miners.11 In other
blockchain-based decentralized digital platforms, the use of the token can be the most diverse
and the most complex.
If the token is necessary to use a decentralized digital platform, this token has positive
value as long as this platform is expected to have some usage in the future. Given this,
the developers behind a platform can sell some tokens to investors before completing its
development. One way to sell a token is via an ICO. ICOs are typically well advertised
and, as already discussed in the introduction, sales of tokens at ICOs exploded in 2017 and
2018.12 But tokens can be sold also on the open market, possibly after the ICO. With few
10 Decentralized computing platforms can also be seen as an operating system running over a network of
computers rather than a single machine. Developers can then create software (which in this context are
smart contracts) that is executed by the network rather than by a single machine.
11 See also Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi (2017) and Easley, O’Hara, and Basu (2019).
12 Usually, tokens sold at ICO start trading on specialized financial exchanges shortly after the end of
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exceptions,13 either token sales on the open market are not disclosed, or they are discussed
only within blog posts and informal communication.14 Despite the difference in visibility
between these two ways of selling tokens, recent work by Howell, Niessner, and Yermack
(2019) and Amsden and Schweizer (2018) show that projects that go through an ICO sell
only about half of their tokens at ICO, with the rest being kept by the founding team. This
indicates that projects that go through an ICO expect to sell as many tokens at ICO as on
the market post-ICO.
2.2 Relevant literature
The novelty of this paper with respect to the existing literature studying blockchain-based
decentralized digital platforms is that, in the model, tokens are both a mean to raise funds
and a mean to earn a profit.
Cong, Li, and Wang (2019) build a model in which tokens can be sold to earn a profit
(but not to raise funds). In their model, the owner of a decentralized digital platform
continuously creates new tokens which can be either sold (and the proceedings consumed)
or used to pay workers who will improve the value of the platform. In their model, the
optimal monetary policy may require the owner to buy back tokens, which can be done by
raising costly external financing. The main result is that, to avoid incurring such cost, the
platform owner will create fewer tokens than optimal. Interestingly, in my model there is
the opposite result: the developer (also the platform owner) may sell too many tokens (that
is, all of them) on the market.
The reason for this difference is that, in the model presented here, the developer has a
finite lifespan and chooses how much effort to exert in the development the decentralized
digital platform. In Cong et al. (2019) instead there is no such effort and the platform
owner has an infinite life. In my opinion, these differences reflect the models’ different
objectives. If the purpose is to study the creation of the platform, then assuming a finite
the ICO. However, some ICOs “lock” their tokens for a period raging from few months to 2 years. During
this period, investors cannot trade tokens, although the emergence of future markets allowed sophisticated
investors to circumvent this limitation. At the expiration of the “lock” period—usually well before the de-
velopment of the platform is completed—trading tokens on specialized financial exchanges becomes possible.
Note that, to the extent that investors value liquidity, “locking” tokens impose a cost on them. It is possible
that “locking” tokens for too long may prevent a developer from raising sufficient funds at ICO.
13 For example, Ripple announces in advance a schedule for selling parts of its XRP stock, see https:
//ripple.com/insights/q1-2018-xrp-markets-report/ (accessed on July 24, 2020).
14 For example, see this blog post by the Ethereum foundation https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/01/07/
2394/ (accessed on July 24, 2020).
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number of development periods and costly effort is reasonable. If the purpose is to study
the maintenance of such platform, then assuming an infinite horizon while abstracting away
from effort is also reasonable.15
The rest of the literature studying blockchain tokens has focused on the ICO. This lit-
erature can be divided into two parts. Most closely related are papers studying the role of
tokens in decentralized digital platforms. Sockin and Xiong (2018), Cong, Li, and Wang
(forthcoming), Bakos and Halaburda (2018), and Li and Mann (2018) argue that because of
network externalities there could be coordination failures in the adoption of a decentralized
digital platform. They study the role of tokens and they way they are sold in achieving the
high-adoption equilibrium.
A second strand of literature has studied ICOs held by startups that are not building
decentralized digital platforms and may even completely unrelated to blockchain. In this
case, a token may represent a voucher and therefore give the right to acquire a good or a
service from the issuer, or may represent a claim on a business revenues, or a combination
of both. This use of blockchain-based tokens is studied in Catalini and Gans (2018), Chod
and Lyandres (forthcoming), Garratt and van Oordt (2019), Malinova and Park (2018). In
those models, the seller of a token also sells a product or a service, which is what generates
a profits. That is, the token only serves as fundraising tool.
There is a growing literature building economic models to study how blockchain works
(see, for example Catalini and Gans, 2016; Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi, 2017; Dimitri,
2017; Prat and Walter, 2018; Ma, Gans, and Tourky, 2018; Budish, 2018). Within this
literature, closely related is Biais, Bisiere, Bouvard, and Casamatta (2019), in which the price
of a token and incentives of miners (i.e., the computers that process transactions and therefore
constitute the nodes of the Bitcoin blockchain) are determined in the equilibrium of a game-
theoretic model. Also in my paper, prices and incentives are determined in equilibrium, but
the interest is in the incentives to develop the protocol rather than processing transactions.
The portion of the model that determines the equilibrium price of the token borrows heavily
from Athey, Parashkevov, Sarukkai, and Xia (2017), who propose an equilibrium model of
the price of Bitcoin. The novelty with respect to their paper is that, here, the demand
15 Note also that Cong et al. (2019) allows the platform owner to create and distribute new tokens in every
period, while here the developer creates the initial stock of tokens initially and then, in every period, decides
how many tokens to sell. Again, if the lifespan of the platform owner/developer is finite then, in both cases,
the platform owner/developer creates and sells a finite amount of tokens. These two assumptions are instead
clearly different if the lifespan of the platform owner/developer is infinite.
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for tokens is a function of the developer’s effort and investment, while the “quality” of the
Bitcoin protocol is taken as given in their model (but is unknown and therefore discovered
over time).16
Gans and Halaburda (2015) study platform-based digital currencies, such as Facebook
credits and Amazon coins. These currencies share some similarities with the tokens discussed
in the Introduction, because they can be used to perform exchanges on a specific platform.
They are, however, controlled by their respective platforms, which decide on their supply
and the extent to which they can be traded or exchanged. This may explain why, despite
some initial concerns,17 these currencies have neither gained wide adoption, nor generated
significant profits for the platform issuing them.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on innovation and incentives, in particular
to the literature studying the motivation behind contributions to open-source software (see
the seminal paper by Lerner and Tirole, 2002). In this respect, I show that open source—
with its organizational structure and ethos—can coexist with strong financial incentives. Of
course, an open question not addressed here is whether or not financial rewards will crowd
out other motives (see, for example, Benabou and Tirole, 2003); that is, whether the open
source ethos will be compromised by the introduction of strong financial incentives.
3 The model
The economy is composed of a developer, a large mass of risk-neutral price-taking investors
and a large mass of users. At the beginning of every period 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the developer
exerts effort et and invests it into the development of a blockchain-based decentralized digital
platform. The development of the protocol lasts T periods, after which the developer exits
the game and users starts using the decentralized digital platform. The decentralized digital
platform can be used indefinitely. At the beginning of the game, the developer establishes
that all transactions on the decentralized digital platform must be conducted using a specific
token, with total supply M , fully owned by the developer.
16 A second, more technical, difference is that Athey et al. (2017) assume that the demand for Bitcoins by
investors is zero in the long run. In my model, instead, the long-run demand for tokens by investors is a
parameter that could be positive. Indeed, the fraction of tokens held by investors in the long run will be an
important determinant of the equilibrium of the model and of its efficiency properties.
17 See, for example “Could Facebook Credits ever compete with dollars and euros?” by
Matthew Yglesias on Slate, February 29, 2012 (available at https://slate.com/business/2012/02/
facebook-credits-how-the-social-networks-currency-could-compete-with-dollars-and-euros.html, accessed on
July 24, 2020).
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In period to ≤ T , the developer sells some tokens to investors via an auction. This
stage is the ICO (Initial Coin Offering) stage, and its date to is chosen by the developer.
In each period after the ICO, but before the developer exits the game (that is, in every
t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T}), first the developer exerts effort and invests, then a frictionless market
for tokens opens. In every period after the developer exits (that is, in every t > T ), first
the market for tokens opens and then users use the platform. See Figure 2 for a graphical
representation of the timeline.
1 ≤ t < to (pre-ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
t = to (ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
Auction for tokens
to < t ≤ T (post-ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
Market for tokens opens
The developer exits in period T
t = T + 1
t+ 1
Market for tokens opens
Users use the platform
Fig. 2: Timeline
Investors. Investors are risk-neutral profit maximizers with no cash constraints. They can
purchase tokens in every period and sell them during any subsequent period. Importantly,
when buying or selling tokens on the market, they are price takers: their net demand for
tokens in period t depends on the sequence of token prices from period t onward, which they
take as given. Investors do not discount the future. They are indifferent between purchasing
any amount of tokens in period t whenever pt = p¯t ≡ maxs>t {E[ps]}, where p¯t is the largest
future expected price. If instead pt > p¯, then the investors’ demand for tokens in period t is
zero. Finally, if pt < p¯, then the investors’ demand for tokens in period t is not defined.
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The developer. Call Qt ∈ [0,M ] the stock of tokens held by the developer at the
beginning of period t, with Q1 = M . Call:
At ≡ A0 +
t−1∑
s=1
[(Qs −Qs+1) · ps − is] = At−1 − it−1 + pt−1(Qt−1 −Qt)
the total resources available to the developer at the beginning of period t, where A0 is the
developer’s initial assets (cash) and the rest are resources earned from the sale of tokens in
previous periods, net of the investments made. To account for the fact that during periods
t < to the developer cannot sell tokens, I impose that pt ≡ 0 for all t < to. Intuitively, in any
t < to the developer cannot sell tokens but can destroy them, which is equivalent to selling
them at price zero. Of course, this will not happen in equilibrium.
In every period, the developer maximizes his end-of-life assets AT+1 minus the disutility
of effort. He faces a per-period feasibility constraint determining the largest investment that
can be made:
it ≤ At.
He also faces a per-period cash constraint establishing an upper bound to the amount of
tokens that he can purchase on the market as a function of his period-t assets and his
period-t investment:
ptmax {Qt+1 −Qt, 0} ≤ At − it. (1)
Note that the cash constraint is always tighter than the feasibility constraint, which can
therefore be disregarded.
Similar to investors, the developer does not discount the future either. Hence, his problem
can be rewritten in recursive form as, for t < T :
Ut(Qt, At) ≡ max
Qt,et,it
{
−1
2
e2t + Ut+1(Qt+1, At + (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it)+
λt(At − it − ptmax {Qt+1 −Qt, 0})} ,
and for t = T :
UT (QT , AT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
AT +QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T + λT (AT − iT )
}
,
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the period-t cash constraint. The se-
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quence of effort, investments and Qt are assumed observable by investors and users .
Users. In period T the development of the protocol stops and users start using the decen-
tralized digital platform. To do so, in every period they first purchase tokens and then use
them to transact on the decentralized digital platform. The total value (in US dollars) of all
exchanges occurring on the decentralized digital platform during a given period is the value
of the decentralized digital platform and is defined as:
VT =
T∑
s=1
f(es, is), (2)
where f(., .) is increasing in both arguments, concave in et, with limi→∞
{
∂f(et,it)
∂it
}
= 0 for
all et. For ease of notation, I assume that each user can access the market for tokens only
once in every period.18 This implies that, in every t > T , those who use the protocol to
purchase goods and services have a demand for tokens in period t equal to VT
pt
, while those
who use the protocol to sell goods or services have a supply of tokens in period t+ 1 equal,
again, to VT
pt
.
Equation (2) is meant to capture in a parsimonious way the fact that the developer’s effort
and investment generates an improvement of the protocol (i.e., lower transaction costs, more
ease of use, increased security, and reliability), which in turns induces more users to use
the platform to perform more/larger transactions. Being parsimonious, however, it also
abstracts away from important elements. For example, because of network externalities, it
is possible that for a given sequence of effort and investment there is both a “high adoption”
equilibrium (in which the value of the decentralized digital platform is high) and a “low
adoption” equilibrium (in which the value of the decentralized digital platform is low). With
a minimal loss of generality, the reader can interpret VT as the value of the decentralized
digital platform in one of these equilibria, the one that the developer expects to emerge.19
18 That is, the winning token has velocity 1. Assuming a different, exogenous velocity will introduce an
additional parameter without affecting the results. The velocity of tokens could, however, be endogenous as
in Prat, Danos, and Marcassa, 2019. As we will see later, the important element here is that the price of
the token increases with the effort exerted by the developer. This result (and, as a consequence, the other
results of presented here) extend to the case in which the velocity of the token is endogenous. Endogenizing
the velocity of the token however opens the possibility that the developer may try to manipulate the price
of token by taking actions that do not affect the value of the platform but only the velocity of the token.
Exploring this possibility is left for future work.
19 The loss of generality is that either the “high” or the “low” adoption equilibrium may not exist for some
sequences of effort and investment, generating a discontinuity in the way effort and investment maps into
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4 Solution
4.1 Periods t ≥ T
I start by solving for the price of the token from period T onward, using the behavior of users
(as captured by equation 2) and an appropriate equilibrium selection criterion (introduced
below).
The fact that no development is possible after period T implies that the price of the
token must be constant from period T onward. Investors are therefore indifferent between
holding cash and holding the token, which implies that there are multiple equilibria: the price
of the token will depend on the stock of tokens held by the investors, who are indifferent
between holding any level of tokens.20 To break this indeterminacy, I impose the following
assumption:
Assumption 1. In equilibrium, the stock of tokens held by investors from period t ≥ T is
γ ·M for γ ∈ [0, 1).
That is, out of the many equilibria possible, I am interested here in those in which the
demand for tokens by investors is a constant fraction of the stock of tokens M .
The term γ ·M therefore represents the “speculative” demand for tokens: the demand for
tokens driven by the expectation that future investors will also demand γ ·M . Next to this
demand, in every period there is a demand and a supply for tokens originating from users.
Because the stock of tokens available to users is (1− γ) ·M , the price for tokens must solve:
pT =
VT
(1− γ)M . (3)
The above equation is an adaptation of the equation of exchange, which is usually employed
to link a country’s price level (here the price of the token relative to “fiat” currency), real
GDP (here VT ), money supply (here the number of tokens available for transacting on the
platform (1 − γ)M) and velocity of money (here assumed equal to 1). For our purposes,
the important implication is that VT — and hence the price at which the developer can sell
the value of the decentralized digital platform.
20 This is a version of a well know result: the indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rate by Kareken
and Wallace (1981). See also example 4.1 in Santos and Woodford (1997), where an overlapping generation
model with two types of money is considered, and the indeterminacy of the exchange rate between the two
types of money is established.
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his token — is strictly increasing in the sequence of effort and investments made by the
developer. As we will see, this motivates the developer to exert effort and invest.21
4.2 The developer’s problem
We start by deriving a useful lemma. This lemma is based on the observation that, in
equilibrium, the expected price of tokens must be constant over time.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, in every period to ≤ t ≤ T , the price of tokens is
pt = E[pT ] =
∑t
s=1 f(es, is) +
∑T
s=t+1E[f(es, is)]
(1− γ)M (4)
An important observation is that what is known by investors—and hence is used to
compute the expectation about the developer future effort and investment—depends on
whether t = to (i.e., the tokens are sold at ICO) or t > to (i.e., the tokens are sold on the
market). The ICO is modeled as an auction, in which the developer announces the supply
of tokens and investors submit bids. The developer’s announcement is used to compute the
future expected effort and investment, and hence determines the token price at ICO. On the
market, instead, investors are price takers, which implies that in every t > to their demand
for tokens depends exclusively on pt and p¯t, and not on the quantity of tokens sold by the
developer in period t.22 To say it differently, in period t > to investors form an expectation
with respect to future effort and investment. This expectation is correct in equilibrium (that
is, for the equilibrium supply of tokens in period t) but will not react to deviations from the
equilibrium. From the developer view point, therefore, in every period t > to, the equilibrium
price for tokens does not depend on the amount of tokens sold in that period. However, as
we will see, the supply of tokens in period t determines the developers’ effort and investment
in period t + 1. Hence, the amount of tokens sold by the developer in a given period affect
the price of tokens in all subsequent periods.
21 Using the equation of exchange to derive the price of the token is convenient but is not essential. All
the results derived below are robust to different assumptions about what happens from period T onward
(i.e., different assumptions regarding the demand and supply of tokens by users or investors, or about the
velocity of the token), provided that pT is increasing in the sequence of effort and investments made by the
developer. Otherwise, the developer has no incentives to exert effort and invest, and the equilibrium is a
trivial one in which no development occurs.
22 Of course, the equilibrium price will be such that demand equals supply; the point is simply that in a
price-taking environment the demand cannot be a function of the supply.
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It is useful to solve the developer’s problem by considering two cases. The first is the “rich
developer” case, in which the developer’s initial assets A0 are sufficient to cover the optimal
level of investment in every period. In this case, the cash constraint is never binding and
can be ignored. The second case is that of a “poor developer”, in which the cash constraint
is binding for at least one period.
4.2.1 Rich developer
If the cash constraint is never binding, the developer’s utility can be written as, for t ≤ T−1:
U˜t(Qt) ≡ max
Qt+1,et,it
{
(Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it − 1
2
e2t + U˜t+1(Qt+1)
}
,
and for t = T :
U˜T (QT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T
}
.
Note that (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it is the cash generated in period t, net of investment. Because
there is no discounting and the cash constraint is never binding, I can include this cash in
period-t utility function (i.e., the period in which it is generated), even if it is consumed in
period T .
We use Lemma 1 to compute optimal effort and optimal investment in any period t:23
e∗(Qt) ≡ argmaxe
{
f(et, i
∗(Qt))
Qt
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
(5)
i∗(Qt) ≡ argmaxit
{
f(e∗(Qt), it)
Qt
(1− γ)M − it
}
. (6)
Hence, optimal effort and investment depend exclusively on Qt and not on the specific time
period t. The reason is that, by Lemma 1, effort and investment in period t increase the
price of tokens in every subsequent period. Hence, the benefit of exerting effort and investing
is the same no matter when the developer plans to sell his tokens.24
Furthermore, Qt and et are complements in the developer’s objective function. This,
23 Under the assumptions made on f(., .) optimal effort and investment must exist. However, they may not
be unique. In what follows, for ease of exposition, I implicitly assume that they are indeed unique, although
no result depends on this assumption.
24 For future reference, note that this logic does not necessary extend to the poor developer case. The
reason is that the level of investment chosen in a given period may determine whether the cash constraint is
binding.
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by Topkis’ theorem, implies that e∗(Qt) is an increasing function. Similarly, Qt and it are
complements in the developer’s objective function, which implies that i∗(Qt) is an increasing
function. At the same time, e∗(0) = i∗(0) = 0. There are therefore two possible cases. The
first one is trivial: e∗(Qt) and i
∗(Qt) are equal to zero for all Qt ≤ M . The second case
is non-trivial: both e∗(Qt) and i
∗(Qt) are increasing in Qt, strictly so somewhere. In what
follows, I focus exclusively on the non-trivial case.
To solve for the optimal choice of Qt+1, as a preliminary step I characterize the shape of
U˜(Qt).
Lemma 2. For all t ∈ {to, ..., T}
∂2U˜(Qt)
∂Q2t
≥ 0,
with strict inequality for some Qt ≤M .
Hence, in every period, the developer’s utility function is convex in Qt, strictly so some-
where. For intuition, note that if the price of tokens is constant in every period, then
∀t ∈ {to, ...T}, U˜(Qt) grows linearly in Qt. However, we know that as Qt increases effort
and investment will also increase, and with them the price of tokens. Because effort and
investment are chosen optimally, U˜(Qt) must grow faster than linearly in Qt.
Consider now the choice of how many tokens to sell on the market. In period T , quite
trivially, the developer will sell all his tokens at price given by (3). Consider therefore a
period t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T − 1}. In such period, the developer can sell any amount of tokens
at the equilibrium market price pt. Hence, the instantaneous opportunity cost of holding
(i.e., not selling) tokens is linear. By the above lemma, the continuation value of holding
tokens is instead positive and convex (strictly so somewhere). It follows that, in every
t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T − 1} the optimal choice of Qt+1 must be a corner solution: either the
developer sells all his tokens (i.e. Qt+1 = 0), or the developer holds on to all his tokens (i.e.
Qt+1 = M), or he randomizes between these two options.
Note, however, that if in equilibrium we have Qt+1 = 0 with probability 1, then investors
should expect no effort nor investment in the following period. This implies that pt should
be low. But if pt is low, then the developer is better off to hold on to his tokens until next
period (i.e. choose Qt+1 = M). If instead in equilibrium we have Qt+1 = M with probability
1, then investors expect high effort and investment in the future. In this case, today’s price
for tokens will incorporate this expectation. The developer should sell all his tokens today so
to benefit from the expectation of his future effort and investment without actually exerting
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any effort or making any investment. Thus, we have an anti-coordination problem, which
implies that the unique equilibrium is in mixed strategy: the price will be such that the
developer is indifferent, and will randomize between Qt+1 = 0 and Qt+1 = M , as the next
proposition shows.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium post-ICO). In every period t ∈ {to+1, ..., T − 1} the developer
sells all his tokens (so that Qt+1 = 0) with probability
α = (1− γ) (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(7)
and purchases all tokens (so that Qt+1 = M) with probability 1− α. The price of tokens as
a function of past effort and investment is
pt =
∑t
s=1 f(es, is) + (1− α)(T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M . (8)
For intuition, note that (e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M) is the cost generated by holding M tokens
in period t, coming from the additional effort and investment that the developer will exert
in period t+ 1. Instead:
M · f(e
∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M ,
is the benefit of holding M tokens in period t, coming from the increase in the value of these
tokens due to the developer’s effort and investment in period t + 1. α is therefore equal
to the ratio between cost and benefit of holding M tokens in period T . Because effort and
investment are chosen optimally, the benefit should be at least as large as the cost, and
therefore α ≤ 1.
Equation (8) can also be interpreted as the law of motion of the price, because it implies
that, in every period t ≤ T , the price of token will increase by:
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
,
with probability:
1− (1− γ) e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
,
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and will decrease by:
1
M
(
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
1− γ − (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M))
)
,
otherwise.
Period to (the ICO) is characterized by the fact that tokens are sold via an auction.
Again, if to = T then the developer will sell all his tokens at price given by (3). If instead
to < T , at ICO (and contrary to all subsequent periods) the price of a token depends on the
number of tokens sold, which is M − Qto . The next proposition shows that the developer
chooses not to sell any token at ICO. The intuition is quite straightforward: the more tokens
the developer sells at ICO, the lower future effort and investment will be. Because investors
must be indifferent between purchasing at ICO or in the subsequent period, this implies that
selling tokens at ICO lowers the price of the token at ICO and in all subsequent periods.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium at to). If the ICO occurs before T , then the developer does not
sell any tokens at ICO. It follows that Qto+1 = M with probability 1. Effort and investment
in all t ≤ to +1 are e∗(M) and i∗(M) with probability 1. If instead the ICO occurs at period
T , then the developer sells all of his tokens at ICO.
Period to + 1 is therefore the only period in which the market for tokens is open and the
developer contributes to the development of the protocol with probability 1.
With respect to the optimal timing of the ICO, the previous proposition shows that
optimal effort and investment between period 1 and to+1 are e
∗(M) and i∗(M). In all
subsequent periods, instead, the existence of the market for tokens creates a commitment
problem: the value of the decentralized digital platform is maximized when the developer
holds M tokens in every period until T . In equilibrium, instead, from period to+2 onward
the developer exerts effort and invests with probability less than one.
Hence, if the ICO occurs in period to < T − 1, then, from period t ≤ to viewpoint, the
developer’s expected payoff is
Vt−1 +
∑to
s=t f (e
∗(M), i∗(M)) + (1− α)∑Tto f (e∗(M), i∗(M))
1− γ −(to−t+(1−α)(T−to))
(
(e∗(M))2
2
+ 1
)
.
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If instead the ICO happens in period T − 1 or in period T , the developer’s payoff is25
Vt−1 +
∑T
s=t f (e
∗(M), i∗(M))
1− γ − (T − t)
(
(e∗(M))2
2
+ 1
)
.
Because effort and investment are chosen optimally, it must be that
f (e∗(M), i∗(M))
1− γ >
(e∗(M))2
2
+ 1,
which implies that the developer’s payoffs is maximized when the ICO is postponed to either
period T or period T − 1. The following proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium to). The developer holds the ICO either in period T or in period
T − 1.
Proof. In the text.
By postponing the ICO, the developer can commit to exert high effort and investment
in all future period. Doing so maximizes the value of the decentralized digital platform and
also the value of the developer’s stock of tokens. As a consequence, in equilibrium, effort
and investment are e∗(M) and i∗(M) with probability 1 in every period.
Corollary 1. The cash constraint is never binding (and hence we are in the “rich developer”
case) if and only if A0 ≥ T · i∗(M).
Proof. Immediate from the above Proposition.
That is, we are in the “rich developer” case whenever the developer does not need to sell
tokens to finance the optimal amount of investment for T periods.
A final observation is that neither the developers’ utility nor the value of the platform
depend on the total stock of tokens M . From (5) and (6) we know that the equilibrium
sequence of effort and investment depends on M exclusively via the share of tokens held by
the developer. This share is 1 for t ≤ to, and can be either 1 or 0 for to < t ≤ T (with
the probability of being 1 or 0 given by 7, also independent from M). This implies that VT
25 Note that if the ICO is held in period T − 1, the developer will auction off 0 tokens, and will sell M
tokens on the market in period T . If instead the ICO is in period T , the developer will sell all of his tokens
via the auction. Holding the ICO in period T − 1 or period T , therefore, achieves the same outcome: the
developer does not sell any tokens before period T and sells all of his tokens in period T .
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and, as a consequence, ptM are independent from M . The developer’s utility is therefore
independent from M for any to.
4.2.2 Poor developer
The rich developer case focuses on one side of seigniorage: the incentives provided to the
developer. It shows that the developer will hold the ICO just before exiting the game, as
a way to commit to the highest level of effort and investment in every period. There is,
however, a second side of seigniorage: the ability to channel funds from investors to the
developer, to be then used in the development of the protocol. I now introduce this aspect
into the model by assuming that the developer is “poor”, in the sense that A0 < T ·i∗(M): the
developer cannot invest efficiently in all periods, and the cash constraint could be binding.
To focus on the role of the cash constraint, I introduce the following functional form:
f(e, i) ≡ e · 1{i ≥ i}, (A1)
where 1{} is the indicator function. Hence, i is an essential input in the development of the
protocol, because effort is productive only if i ≥ i. However, investing more that i is also
not productive. The choice of optimal investment, therefore, simplifies to the choice between
two levels: i and 0. If there is positive investment, then effort increases the value of the
decentralized digital platform linearly. I furthermore assume that the fixed cost is not too
large:
i <
1
2
(
1
1− γ
)2
, (A2)
As it will become clear later, the above assumption eliminates trivial equilibria in which
there is never positive effort nor investment.
The next proposition shows that, also here, in all post-ICO periods (except for T ) the
equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium post-ICO). In every period t ∈ {to+1, ..., T} the developer sets
effort and investment equal to
e∗(Qt, At) ≡


Qt
(1−γ)M
if it ≥ i
0 otherwise
(9)
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i∗(Qt, At) ≡


i if i ≤ 1
2
(
Qt
(1−γ)M
)2
and i ≤ At
0 otherwise.
(10)
In period T the developer sells all his tokens with probability 1. In periods t ∈ {to+1, ..., T−1},
instead, there are several possible equilibria:
• There is a “low” equilibrium in which the developer chooses Qt+1 = 0, so that subsequent
effort and investment are zero.26 Such equilibrium exists if and only if
Vt
(
Qt
(1− γ)M −
√
2¯i
)
< i∗(Qt, At) + i− At.
• There is a “high” equilibrium in which the developer sells all his tokens (so that Qt+1 =
0) with probability α and holds on to all his tokens (so that Qt+1 = M) with probability
1− α, where
α =
1
2
+ i(1− γ)2.
Such equilibrium exists if and only if
(
Vt
(1− γ) +
1
2(1− γ)2 − i
)(
1− Qt
M
)
≤ At − i∗(Qt, At)− i.
• There is a “medium” equilibrium in which the developer chooses Qt+1 = 0 with proba-
bility α and Qt+1 = Q
∗
t+1 < M with probability 1− α, where
α =
1
2
+ i
(
(1− γ)M
Q∗t+1
)2
.
Such equilibrium exists if and only if Q∗t+1 solution to
Q∗t+1 = Qt −
it + i− At
Vt
(1−γ)M
+
Q∗t+1
2((1−γ)M)2
− i
Q∗t+1
lies in
[
(1− γ)M
√
2¯i,M
]
.
An equilibrium always exists. If AT−1−iT−1 ≥ i, either a “high” equilibrium or a “medium”
26 The developer could also set Qt+1 small but not exactly zero. As long as the subsequent effort and
investment are zero, this would also be an equilibrium.
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equilibrium exist. If AT−1−iT−1 < i instead there can be multiple equilibria: a low equilibrium
as well as multiple “medium” equilibra might exist.
Also here, when the market for tokens is open, there is the same anti-coordination problem
discussed in the “rich developer” case. If investors expect the developer to hold a sufficient
number of tokens for sure, then the current price should reflect future effort and investment.
But given this the developer should sell all his tokens today. Similarly, if investors expect
the developer to sell all his tokens, the price of tokens should be low. But given this, the
developer should hold on a positive amount of tokens. Hence, also here, in equilibrium the
developer will randomize between selling all tokens and holding the maximum amount of
tokens.
Here, however, the maximum amount of tokens the developer can keep may be determined
by the cash constraint. If this constraint is binding, then Q∗t+1 < M is the largest token
holdings allowing the developer to invest optimally in the following period. Importantly, if
Q∗t+1 is too low (more precisely Q
∗
t+1 < (1− γ)M
√
2¯i) then a developer setting Qt+1 = Q
∗
t+1
will not want to invest in period t+ 1 despite being able to do so.
The important observation is that Q∗t+1 may not be uniquely determined, and hence there
could be multiple equilibria. When At − it < i, after investing in period t, the developer
does not have enough funds to invest also in period t+1. Hence, the developer needs to sell
tokens on the market to be able to invest in the following period. In this case, there could
be a “low” equilibrium next to multiple “medium” equilibria. This equilibrium multiplicity
arises from a coordination problem between the developer and investors. There could be
an equilibrium in which investors expect future effort to be high, driving up pt. Given this,
the developer will be able to finance future investments while simultaneously holding a large
fraction of tokens (i.e., Q∗t+1 is high). As a consequence, future expected effort will be high.
Next to this equilibrium, there could be one in which investors expect future effort to be low
(or zero), which implies that pt is low. In this equilibrium, the developer needs to sell many
tokens to finance future investment (i.e., Q∗t+1 is low), and therefore future expected effort
will be low or even zero.
If instead At − it ≥ i, after investing in period t, the developer has enough funds to
invest also in period t + 1. In this case, the developer may purchase additional tokens on
the market. The equilibrium is always unique, and could be either a “high” equilibrium, or
a “medium” equilibrium.
Finally, note that because of this multiplicity of equilibria, it is not in general possible
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to write down a law of motion of the price for tokens. Such law of motion can be specified
only by first defining which equilibrium is expected to emerge in every period.
Consider now period to (the ICO).
Proposition 5. In every t ≤ to, optimal effort and investment are again given by (9) and
(10).
If to = T , the developer sell all his tokens at ICO, so that, in equilibrium, Qto+1 = 0.
If to < T and Ato − ito ≥ i, then the developer does not sell any token at ICO, so that, in
equilibrium, Qto+1 = M .
If to < T and Ato − ito < i, then define Q˜ as the largest solution to
Ato +
(
M − Q˜
)
·
(
Vto
(1− γ)M +
Q˜
((1− γ)M)2
)
− ito = i.
If Q˜ ∈
[
(1− γ)M
√
2¯i,M
]
, then in equilibrium Qto+1 = Q˜. Effort and investment will be
strictly positive in period to+1. If instead either Q˜ does not exist or Q˜ < (1−γ)M
√
2¯i, then
any Qto+1 ≤ M is an equilibrium. In this case, there is no effort nor investment in period
to + 1.
Remember that, if t0 < T , then there is at least one period of development after the ICO.
Because effort and investments are increasing in the amount of tokens held by the developer,
the price for tokens at ICO is decreasing in the amount of tokens sold at ICO. Also, by
Lemma 1, in expectation the price of tokens is constant over time. Hence, the value of the
stock of tokens M is decreasing in the amount of tokens sold at ICO.
This implies that the developer will want to sell as few tokens as possible at ICO. If
Ato − ito ≥ i, then the developer will be able to invest optimally in period to + 1 without
selling any token at ICO—which is therefore the equilibrium. If instead Ato − ito < i, to
invest optimally in the following period, the developer needs to sell some tokens at ICO. But
if the amount of tokens to be sold is too large, then in the following period the developer
has no incentive to invest. In this case, the only possible equilibrium is one in which there
is no investment nor effort following the ICO.
Hence, similarly to the “rich developer” case, also here the equilibrium at ICO is unique
and in pure strategy. Also, period to + 1 may be the only period in which the market for
tokens is open and the developer invests and exerts effort with probability 1. However, here
the ICO may be unsuccessful—in the sense that the developer is unable to raise funds at
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ICO. This is more likely to happen when the developer’s own funds Ato are low, and the cost
of investing i is large.
With respect to the timing of the ICO, if the developer has enough resources to invest,
then the logic discussed in the “rich developer case” applies here as well: the developer will
not hold an ICO so to optimally invest in every period. The developer will hold the ICO
as soon as his resources are insufficient to invest, so to continue the development of the
platform. I summarize this observation in the following remark.
Remark 1. In equilibrium, the developer holds the ICO in period to = max{t|t · i ≤ A0},
where A0 are the developer’s initial assets.
Hence, by Proposition 4, when the market for tokens is open, there can be a “medium”
or a “low” equilibrium (or both) but never a ‘high” equilibrium. This implies that, for t ≤ to
we have Q∗t = M , while for t > to we have Q
∗
t < M .
Finally, also here the equilibrium is independent of M . The above remark shows that the
timing of the ICO does not depend on M . Similarly (9) and (10) show that optimal effort
and investment depend on the share of tokens held by the developer. Furthermore, the share
of tokens held by the developer in equilibrium does not depend on M—see the definition of
Q∗t+1 in Proposition 4 and the definition of Q˜ in Proposition 5. This implies that, in every
period t, the value of the platform Vt as well as the total value of the stock of tokens pt ·M
is independent of M .
5 First best
In the first best, effort and investment are set to maximize the present discounted value of
the social welfare generated by the protocol from period T onward, where the discount factor
is that of users. I consider the social welfare generated by the platform in every period to
be equal to the volume of transactions on the platform, that is VT .
27
The equilibrium of the game differs from the first best in several ways. As already
discussed, if the developer is poor, he will hold the ICO after exhausting his own funds. This
is, however, inefficient because, in every post-ICO period, the developer may set zero effort
and zero investment, even if the social value of his effort and investment is strictly positive.
27 Of course, more in general, the social welfare generated by the platform in every period should depend on
the slope of the demand function of those on the buying side of the platform, and on the slope of the supply
function of those on the selling side of the platform. It is quite easy to make assumptions on those slopes
such that surplus is equal to VT—for example, −1 and 1 for the slope of demand and supply respectively.
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More interestingly, even assuming that the developer is rich, there is an additional source of
inefficiency. The developer is setting effort and investment so as to maximize the value of
the decentralized digital platform in period T—when he will exit the game—and completely
disregards the fact that the protocol will generate value over multiple periods.
To see this, consider the rich developer case. Social welfare is:
∞∑
s=T
βs−TVT =
VT
1− β ,
where β is the users’ discount factor. The choice of effort and investment that maximize
social welfare is:
e∗∗ ≡ argmaxe
{
f(e, i∗∗)
1− β −
1
2
e2
}
(11)
i∗∗ ≡ argmaxi
{
f(e∗∗, i)
1− β − i
}
. (12)
By comparing the above expression with the equilibrium level of effort and investment (equa-
tions 5 and 6), it is clear that equilibrium effort and investment will be below the efficient
level if γ < β, and above the efficient level if γ > β.
To determine which case is more likely, I turn to some back-of-the-envelope calculations
using data from Ethereum. Remember that γ is the fraction of tokens held by investors from
period T onward. The empirical counterpart for γ is therefore the fraction of tokens held by
investors when the project is mature and (major) developments no longer occur. This is a
stage no blockchain-based protocol has yet reached. The best approximation possible is to
consider some of the oldest, better established blockchain project, and calculate the fraction
of the corresponding tokens kept by investors. However, with the exception of Ethereum, all
oldest, better established blockchain-based protocols are digital currencies (such as Bitcoin),
where only one operation is allowed: sending tokens. Because this operation is consistent
both with investors’ behavior and with usage (for example, sending remittances), it is very
difficult to distinguish between users and investors.28 Instead, Ethereum is the oldest and
better established decentralized computing platform, used primarily to run software, which
are in this context called smart contracts. The fraction of ETH (Ethereum native token)
paid in fees is therefore a measure of the value of the decentralized digital platform Vt:
the payments (in tokens) from users of Ethereum to the nodes maintaining the Ethereum
28 For more details on these difficulties, see Athey et al. (2017).
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network, performed in exchange for a service—executing a smart contract.29
After collecting data on the total fees paid on the Ethereum network,30 what remains
to do in order to derive γ is to define the length of a period. In the model, users can
exchange fiat money for tokens once in every period. The empirical equivalent of a “period”
is, therefore, the inverse of the velocity of ETH: the average number of days before a given
token can be used again to pay a fee. Absent any good prior, I will consider different possible
values, from one to 30 days.
I therefore compute the average value of:
1− total transaction fees collected over n days
total stock of ETH
,
for the year 2019, where the n goes from 1 to 30. This value corresponds to γ, under the
assumption that a single period of the model corresponds to n days. I compare this value
to the discount factor over n days, computed assuming a daily discount factor of 0.015%
(approximately a 5% yearly discount factor). As Table 1 shows, for all values of n, the
estimated γ is orders of magnitude above β. This is because the vast majority of ETH are
held by investors and never used to pay fees. This suggests that the equilibrium effort and
investment is above the efficient level.31
The above result is specific to the rich developer case. In the poor developer case, after
ICO, the developer invests and exerts effort with probability less than one. Furthermore,
conditional on exerting effort, because in every period he holds less than the full stock of
tokens, his level of effort and investment are lower than in the rich developer case. By
comparing the values for β and γ in Table 1 for n = 10, as long as the developer holds more
than 0.15% of the share of tokens, he will set effort and investment above the social optimum.
It seems likely, therefore, that conditional on exerting positive effort and investment, the level
of effort and investments will be above the socially optimal level, even in the “poor developer”
case.
29 As in the Bitcoin network, these nodes also earn a “per-block” reward. In the case of Ethereum, however,
this reward is a much smaller component of the node’s total payoff. As a consequence, performing any
operation on the Ethereum network requires the payment of a fee.
30 Easily downloadable from several sources, such as https://etherscan.io/chart/transactionfee
31 In these calculations, I considered the total stock of ETH as the total number of ETH in existence at
the end of year 2019 (that is, 1,577,750,400). The conclusion remains the same if I were to consider the total
number of ETH in existence at the beginning of 2019 (that is, 1,546,300,800).
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n γ β
1 ≈1 0,00015
2 0,999999 0,00030
3 0,999999 0,00045
4 0,999999 0,00060
5 0,999999 0,00075
6 0,999998 0,00090
7 0,999998 0,00105
8 0,999997 0,00120
9 0,999997 0,00135
10 0,999997 0,00150
20 0.999993 0.00300
30 0.999990 0.00451
Tab. 1: Data from https://etherscan.io/chart, elaborated by the author
6 Discussion
6.1 Seigniorage vs monopoly pricing
It is possible to compare seigniorage with more standard pricing. Profits generated via
seigniorage depend on the value of the decentralized digital platform in the moment at which
the developer sells his tokens. Under standard monopoly pricing, the monopolist captures
a fraction of the value of the decentralized digital platform in every period; not only in one
period.
The same back-of-the envelope calculations reported in Table 1 allow to compare profits
under seigniorage with profits under monopoly pricing. Call τ the fraction of total value lost
as deadweight loss caused by monopoly pricing, and ν the fraction of the remaining value
that is captured by the monopolist in every period.32 Profits earned via monopoly pricing
from period T onward are therefore:
∞∑
s=T
βs−Tν(1− τ)VT = ν(1− τ)VT
1− β ,
which are greater than profits earned via seigniorage if and only if:
ν(1− τ) ≥ 1− β
1− γ .
32 There two parameters depend on the elasticity of supply/demand of those using the platform to sell/buy.
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The above inequality can be satisfied only if β > γ. However, Table 1 suggests that, em-
pirically, γ > β. This implies that profits under seigniorage are larger than profits under
monopoly pricing for any value of ν and τ .
6.2 Traditional investor
In the rich developer case, the developer uses his own resources to finance the investment
in the protocol, so that seigniorage plays a role exclusively because it generates profits
and provides incentives. In the poor developer case, seigniorage has the additional role of
providing resources to be invested into the development of the protocol. The comparison
between the two cases shows that the use of seigniorage to finance the investment in the
protocol is a second-best response to the developer’s lack of resource, because the value of
the decentralized digital platform (and the developer’s payoff) is always higher in the rich
developer case.
This observation suggests that an external investor (call it a traditional investor, possibly
a venture capital fund or a business angel) could provide capital to the developer so as to
move from the poor developer to the rich developer case, and by doing so generate extra
surplus.33 Under perfect contracting, therefore, in the poor developer case the traditional
investor would always provide funds to the developer. If instead the traditional investor and
the developer are constrained in the type of contracts they can sign—-for example because
effort is not contractible—then the external investor may not provide funds even if it is
welfare improving to do so. In this case, the development of the platform can only be
financed by holding an early ICO (i.e., an ICO before period T − 1).
To illustrate this point, assume that the developer and the investor are limited to con-
tracts of the following type: the investor provides an amount of cash equal to I at the
beginning of the game, and receives a fraction of tokens ρ at ICO. If I is sufficiently large,
such a contract has the advantage of postponing the ICO, and therefore extending the period
in which the developer develops the protocol with probability 1. However, it also implies that
in every period of development the level of effort and investment will be reduced, because the
33 Regarding the fact that traditional investors are investing in companies that subsequently run
an ICO, see https://www.cbinsights.com/research/blockchain-ico-equity-financing-vc-investments/
(accessed on July 24, 2020) and https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-03/
hedge-funds-flip-icos-leaving-other-investors-holding-the-bag (accessed on July 24, 2020). See also a
recent paper by Chod and Lyandres (ming), who compare traditional venture capital financing with
financing via ICO under the assumption that they are perfect substitutes, and derive conditions under
which one dominates the other.
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developer anticipates that his payoff will be (1 − ρ)MpT . Clearly, there are cases in which
the outside investment will not happen. For example, if the developer already has enough
funds to invest efficiently in the first T − 2 periods , then external financing allows to invest
and exert effort with probability 1 in one extra period, at the expense of reducing the level
of investment and effort during T periods. If T is very large, then the developer may choose
to hold the ICO in period T − 2 rather than accepting I from the external investor.
Overall, introducing a traditional investor is welfare-increasing: when a contract between
the developer and the investor is signed, it must be the case that the value of the decentralized
digital platform increases (relative to no outside investment). But contractual frictions may
prevent the traditional investor and the developer from finding an agreement. In this case,
the developer may hold an early ICO.
6.3 Asymmetric information
The results derived above largely extend to a situation in which the developer’s productivity
is private information. In this case, if the market for tokens is open, for a given price for
tokens there is a threshold productivity above which the developer wants to hold all tokens,
and below which the developer wants to sell all tokens. In every period, if the developer
is more productive that the market expectation, he will purchase tokens and develop the
protocol with probability 1. If the developer is less productive than the market expectation,
he will sell all tokens and not develop the protocol.
The important observation is that the productivity of the developer will be revealed
over time. In the moment it is fully revealed, the equilibrium of the game is again the one
derived in the previous section. Asymmetry of information therefore implies that developers
with above average productivity may contribute to the development of the protocol with
probability 1 for some periods. Conversely, developers with below average productivity do
not contribute to the protocols initially. After the developer’s productivity is revealed, he
will contribute with probability less than 1, as in the symmetric information case.
6.4 Multiple, heterogeneous developers
Suppose that there is a population of developers indexed by j, each characterized by a
productivity parameter qjt (commonly known) so that effort and investment by developer
j in period t generates an increase in the value of the decentralized digital platform equal
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to qjt f(e
j
t , i
j
t). If all developers are “rich” (that is, the cash constraint is never binding for
any developer), in every period t the equilibrium price of the token must be such that the
developer with the largest qit+1 is indifferent between holding all tokens or no tokens.
34 If,
furthermore, maxj q
j
t is constant over time, then the model is formally identical to the one
just solved. The only difference is its interpretation: in every period a different developer
(the most productive in that period) may purchase tokens and contribute to the development
of the platform.
Contrary to the case considered in the body of the text, now the existence of a market for
tokens generates an allocative efficiency: the most productive developer works on the project
in every period. Of course, as we already saw, this developer contributes to the project only
with some probability. It follows that holding an ICO has an additional benefit because it
allows the most productive developer to contribute to the project in every period. Absent
the ICO, instead, the initial developer will set high effort and investment in every period,
but this developer may not be the most productive developer who could work on the project.
If instead some developers are “poor” (i.e., the cash constraint may be binding), then
the most productive developer in a given period may not have enough resources to purchase
tokens and/or invest efficiently. The identity of the developer that, in every period, develops
the platform (with some probability) depends partly on productivity and partly on wealth.
7 Conclusion
An attentive reader may have noticed a troubling aspect of the model. In equilibrium, the
developer earns positive profits, users enjoy the full surplus generated by the platform, while
at the same time investors are left indifferent. This implies that the sum of the players’
payoffs exceeds the social surplus generated by the creation of the platform. While this
result is correct, it is an artifact of the partial-equilibrium nature of the model. In a general
equilibrium framework, introducing the token increases the supply of money in the economy
by an amount equal to the value of the stock of tokens (which is also the developer’s profits),
leading to an increase in the economy-wide price level.35 Initial holders of cash are therefore
34 Suppose not: then the best developer strictly prefers to hold all tokens and exert the maximum level
of effort and investment in the following period. However, in that case, this developer’s contribution to the
protocol should already be accounted for in the current price, which implies that he strictly prefers to sell
all of his tokens, leading to a contradiction.
35 For general equilibrium models in which the economy-wide price level depends on the presence of a
cryptocurrency (Bitcoin), see Schilling and Uhlig (2019) and Garratt and Wallace (2018).
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made worse off by the introduction of the token. In this general-equilibrium framework, the
developer should anticipate that an increase in the value of the decentralized digital platform
will lead to an increase both of the price of the token and of the economy-wide price level,
therefore reducing the benefit of exerting effort and developing the protocol (relative to the
partial-equilibrium case considered in the body of the paper.) The effect of the developer’s
effort on the economy-wide price level is, however, likely to be negligible and hence a partial-
equilibrium analysis seems appropriate.
During the writing of the first version of this paper, there was a robust debate relative
to whether tokens such as the ones studied in this paper (i.e., those associated with a de-
centralized digital platform, sometimes called utility tokens) should be considered securities,
and hence subject to security regulation. Over the past few years most regulatory bodies
started considering tokens associated with decentralized digital platform in the early devel-
opment stage as securities, while tokens associated with decentralized digital platform that
are already sufficiently functional as not securities.36 The model suggests that the price of
the token is less volatile and less dependent on the developer’s actions after period T than
before period T . Because period T marks the end of the development of the platform, the
model provides support to the current regulatory stance.
The model abstracts away from competition, either from other open-source blockchain-
based protocols or traditional companies. In ongoing work (Canidio, 2020), I consider a
simplified version of the model presented here, in which multiple developers can hold ICOs
and enter the market. In that model, the fact that developers hold an ICO (instead of using
their own resources) encourages other developers to also hold ICOs and enter the market.
Hence, despite the fact that ICOs weaken incentives, they also stimulate competition. Under
some conditions, ICOs are welfare improving (relative to a situation in which the development
of the platform is fully self financed).
The timing of the ICO is also likely to be affected by the competition (an aspect not stud-
ies in Canidio, 2020). Remember that, in the model, users enjoy the full surplus generated
by the protocol. Hence, a competing open-source blockchain-based protocol (or a traditional
36 For example, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not consider Bitcoin nor
ETH securities, on the ground that, at this point, “there is no central party whose ef-
forts are a key determining factor in the enterprise” (see https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/14/
bitcoin-and-ethereum-are-not-securities-but-some-cryptocurrencies-may-be-sec-official-says.html accessed
on July 24, 2020). However, recent ICOs of tokens associated with platforms at a very early development stage
have been prosecuted (see the case of Telegram’s ICOs - https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-212
accessed on July 24, 2020). In most cases, this simply implies that it is not possible to sell tokens at ICO to
people residing in the US.
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company) can attract users only if it can generate a higher surplus, either by providing a
better technological solution or by attracting a larger user base. This could affect the timing
of the ICO. If there are “winner takes all” dynamics and network effects, it is conceivable
that the developer will want to anticipate the ICO, so as to build a sufficiently large user
base and prevent the entrance of competitors. However, assuming that the source code is
disclosed at ICO, holding an ICO earlier also gives the opportunity for competitors to copy
the code and imitate some features. The full treatment of this case is left for future work.
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A Mathematical appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If the expected price of tokens is strictly increasing between two dates,
then the demand for tokens is not defined in some periods, which cannot be an equilibrium.
If the expected price for tokens is strictly decreasing over time but never increasing, then
there is a period in which the expected price for tokens achieves a maximum. In this period,
the demand for tokens from investors is zero, which implies that the expected maximum
price for tokens must be zero. This is a contradiction because if the expected maximum
price is zero, then the sequence of expected prices is constant at zero.
Hence, in every period t ≤ T , in equilibrium the sequence of future expected prices must
be constant. We can therefore write the price of tokens in every period as pt = E[pT ]. Since
the sequence of effort and investment from period 1 to t is known, the expectation is taken
exclusively with respect to the future sequence of investments and effort, leading to equation
(4).
Proof of Lemma 2. By the envelope and Lemma 1, we can compute
∂U˜(Qt)
∂Qt
= f(e∗(Qt), i
∗(Qt)).
For Qt such that both e
∗(Qt) and i
∗(Qt) are constant, we have that
∂U˜(Qt)
∂Qt
is constant. For
Qt such that either e
∗(Qt) or i
∗(Qt) are strictly increasing, we have that
∂U˜(Qt)
∂Qt
is strictly
increasing. By assumption, there are Qt ≤ M such that either e∗(Qt) or i∗(Qt) are strictly
increasing.
Proof of Proposition 1. I first show that the equilibrium in period T − 1 is indeed in mixed
strategies. I then use this fact to show that the equilibrium in all periods t ∈ {to+1, ..., T−1}
is in mixed strategies.
Consider the choice of QT in period T − 1. As already discussed in the body of the text,
the developer’s problem has a corner solution: depending on pT−1, the developer will either
sell all of his tokens (when pT−1 is high), purchase as many tokens as possible (when pT−1
is low), or be indifferent between these two options. The price at which the developer is
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indifferent is:
pT−1 =
U˜T (M)
M
=
VT−1 + f(e
∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M −
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
, (13)
where VT−1+f(e
∗(M),i∗(M))
(1−γ)M
is the period T price in case the developer holds M tokens at the
beginning of period T .
As already discussed in the body of the text, we have an anti-coordination problem
between investors and the developer, which implies that the unique equilibrium is in mixed
strategy: the price will be such that the developer is indifferent, and the developer will
randomize between QT = 0 and QT = M . More precisely, if the developer sells all of his
tokens in period T − 1, then the price in period T will be VT−1
(1−γ)M
. If instead the developer
purchases M tokens in period T − 1, then pT = VT−1+f(e
∗(M),i∗(M))
(1−γ)M
. Because investors must
be indifferent between purchasing in period T or period T − 1, it must be that:
pT−1 =
VT−1
(1− γ)M + (1− αT−1)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M ,
where αT−1 is the probability that the developer sells all of his tokens in period T −1, which
using (13) can be written as:
αT−1 = (1− γ) (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
.
Therefore, in equilibrium, in period T − 1 the developer is indifferent between selling all
of his tokens or keeping all of his tokens. It follows that I can write:
U˜T−1(QT−1) = max
eT−1,iT−1,eT ,iT
{
−iT−1 −
e2T−1
2
+Qt−1 · pT−1
}
,
that is, I can write the utility in period T − 1 assuming that the developer sells all of his
tokens in period T−1. This immediately implies that the problem in period T−2 is identical
to the problem in period T − 1. That is, in period T − 2 the developer is indifferent between
QT−1 = 0 and QT−1 = M whenever
pT−2 =
U˜T−1(M)
M
=
VT−2 + f(e
∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M −
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
,
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and investors are indifferent between purchasing in period T − 2 or T − 1 whenever
pT−1 =
VT−2
(1− γ)M + (1− αT−2)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M .
Using the above two expression to solve for αT−2 we again get
αT−2 = αT−1 = (1− γ) (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
.
The statement of the proposition follows by applying the same argument recursively to
all periods after the ICO.
Proof of Proposition 2. Again, in equilibrium, investors must be indifferent, and therefore,
for any number of tokens sold at ICO, it must be that pto = pto+1. Hence, whenever to < T ,
the developer’s problem at ICO can be written as:
max
Qto+1
{
(M −Qto+1)pto + U˜to+1(Qto+1)
}
=
max
Qto+1
{
(M −Qto+1)pto+1 + max
eto+1,ito+1
{
Qto+1 · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1
}}
≤
max
Qto+1
{
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
Qto+1 · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1 + (M −Qto+1)pto+1
}}
=
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
M · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1
}
= U˜to+1(M),
where the first and the last equality follow from writing U˜to+1(Qto+1) explicitly.
37 The de-
veloper therefore anticipates that the price of tokens will be the same at ICO and in the
following period, independently from how many token he sells. The number of tokens sold,
however, determines the equilibrium level of effort and investment in period to+1.
Proof or Proposition 4. I follow the same steps described in the proof of Proposition 1. First,
I consider period T − 1, derive optimal effort and investment and show that the equilibrium
must be in mixed strategy. Then, I argue that the equilibrium in all periods t ∈ {to +
1, ..., T − 2} is identical to that in period T − 1.
37 Remember that in every post ICO period the developer is indifferent between selling all his tokens or
holding all tokens. Hence the utility in period to + 1 is equal to the utility the developer earns if he sells all
of his tokens in period to+1 and never purchases them again.
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Period-T effort and investment are:
e∗T (QT , AT ) ≡


QT
(1−γ)M
if iT ≥ i
0 otherwise
(14)
i∗T (QT , AT ) ≡


i if i ≤ 1
2
(
QT
(1−γ)M
)2
and i ≤ AT
0 otherwise.
(15)
Define:
Qˆ ≡ (1− γ)M
√
2¯i, (16)
so that the developer invests whenever i ≤ AT and QT ≥ Qˆ, and will not invest otherwise.
Note that, by (A2), we have Qˆ < M . Given this, it is immediate to check that UT (QT , AT )
is strictly convex in QT whenever i ≤ AT and QT ≥ Qˆ, and is otherwise linear in QT .
UT (QT , AT ) is linearly increasing in AT with slope 1 (corresponding to the marginal utility
of consumption), and has an upward discontinuity at AT = i if and only if QT ≥ Qˆ.
Consider now the choice of QT in period T − 1. For a given market price pT−1, the
developer’s utility as a function of QT is:
38
UT (QT , AT−1+(QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1− iT−1)+λT−1(AT−1− iT−1− pT−1 max {QT −QT−1, 0}).
where
UT (QT , AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1) =

QT
VT−1
(1−γ)M +
1
2
(
QT
(1−γ)M
)2
+AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1 − i if QT ≥ Qˆ
and AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i
QT
VT−1
(1−γ)M +AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1 otherwise,
(17)
and λT−1 is the Lagrange multiplier of the cash constraint, which establishes an upper bound
to the number of tokens that the developer can purchase on the market in period T − 1.
Define Q∗T as the largest QT such that the developer can invest i in period T : that is,
38 The utility in period T − 1 also depends on effort exerted in that period, which is sunk when QT is
chosen.
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the largest QT such that AT = AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1 is at least i:
Q∗T ≡ QT−1 −
iT−1 + i− AT−1
pT−1
(18)
Note that there are three possibilities:
1. Q∗T may be greater than M , in which case, for given pT−1, the developer is able to hold
on to the entire stock of tokens and still invest i in the following period.
2. Q∗T > 0 may not exist, which implies that, at a given pT−1, it is not possible for the
developer to raise enough to then invest i
3. Q∗T ∈ [0,M ] exists. In this case, Note that if the developer sets QT = Q∗T then
AT = AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1− iT−1 = i, which implies that QT = Q∗T satisfies the
period T − 1 cash constrain.
Note also that if AT−1−iT−1 ≥ i, then for given investment in period T−1, the developer’s
remaining funds are sufficient to invest in period T . In this case Q∗T ≥ QT−1, that is, the
developer can purchase additional tokens on the market and still be able to invest in period
T . Hence, we must be either in case 1 or 3 above. On the other hand, when AT−1− iT−1 < i
(i.e. the developer’s remaining funds are insufficient to invest in period T ), then necessarily
Q∗T < QT−1: the developer needs to sell some token in period T − 1 in order to invest in
period T . Hence, we must be either in case 2 or 3 above.
I now derive the three possible equilibria of the game
“high” equilibrium (Q∗T ≥ M) This case is identical to the “rich developer” case. The
developer’s continuation value is strictly increasing, and strictly convex for QT ≥ Qˆ. Again,
in equilibrium the developer randomizes between QT = 0 and QT = M .
For the developer to be indifferent, it must be that:
pT−1 =
UT (M,AT )
M
=
VT−1
(1− γ)M +
1
2(1− γ)2M −
i
M
(19)
For investors to be indifferent, the developer should sell all his tokens with probability αT−1
such that
pT−1 = αT−1
VT−1
(1− γ)M + (1− αT−1)
(
VT−1
(1− γ)M +
1
(1− γ)2M
)
(20)
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Putting the above two expressions together we get:
αT−1 =
1
2
+ i(1− γ)2
This is indeed an equilibrium if:
Q∗T = QT−1 −
iT−1 + i− AT−1
VT−1
(1−γ)M
+ 1
2(1−γ)2M
− i
M
≥M
or (
VT−1
(1− γ) +
1
2(1− γ)2 − i
)(
1− QT−1
M
)
≤ AT−1 − iT−1 − i (21)
Note that the above is possible only if AT−1− iT−1 > i, that is, the agent wealth is sufficient
to invest i.
“low” equilibrium (either Q∗T > 0 does not exist or Q
∗
T < Qˆ) In this case, there is no QT
for which there will be positive effort and investment in the future. The equilibrium price is
pT−1 = pT =
VT−1
(1− γ)M .
At such price, we have
Q∗T ≡ QT−1 −
iT−1 + i− AT−1
VT−1
(1−γ)M
which always exist but may be negative. Because Qˆ > 0, then, the “low” equilibrium exists
if and only if Q∗T < Qˆ, which using (16) and (18), becomes:
VT−1
(
QT−1
(1− γ)M −
√
2¯i
)
< iT−1 + i− AT−1. (22)
Note that the above equilibrium can exist only if AT−1 − iT−1 < i, that is, the agent wealth
is not sufficient to invest i.
“medium” equilibrium (Q∗T ∈ [Qˆ,M ]) In this case, the previous discussion implies that
the continuation value
UT (QT , AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1),
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QT
UT (QT , AT−1 + (M − QT ) · pT − iT−1)
Q∗TQˆ M
Fig. 3: Continuation value as a function of QT .
is strictly convex in QT for Qt ∈ [Qˆ, Q∗T ] and is linearly increasing in QT for Qt 6∈ [Qˆ, Q∗T ].
Furthermore, if Qˆ < Q∗T then the continuation value has a downward discontinuity at Q
∗
T
(see Figure 3). The argument presented for the “rich developer” case applies here as well:
the only possible equilibrium is one in which the developer randomizes between QT = 0 and
QT = Q
∗
T . For the developer to be indifferent, it must be that:
pT−1 =
UT (Q
∗
T , i¯)
Q∗T
=
VT−1
(1− γ)M +
Q∗T
2((1− γ)M)2 −
i
Q∗T
(23)
For investors to be indifferent, the developer should sell all his tokens with probability αT−1
such that
pT−1 = αT−1
VT−1
(1− γ)M + (1− αT−1)
(
VT−1
(1− γ)M +
Q∗T
((1− γ)M)2
)
(24)
Putting the above two expressions together we get:
αT−1 =
1
2
+ i
(
(1− γ)M
Q∗
)2
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By using (18) and (23), we can express Q∗T as:
Q∗T = QT−1 −
iT−1 + i− AT−1
VT−1
(1−γ)M
+
Q∗
T
2((1−γ)M)2
− i
Q∗
T
(25)
Hence, such “medium” equilibrium exists if and only if the solution to the above equation is
in [Qˆ,M ].
A few relevant observations:
• it is easy to check that, the RHS of (25) is below its LHS at Q∗T = Qˆ if and only if
(22) holds. At the same time the RHS of (25) is above its LHS at Q∗T = M if and only
if (21) holds.
• by continuity, a “medium” equilibrium must exist whenever both (22) and (21) hold.
A “medium” equilibrium must exist also when neither (22) nor (21) hold.
• In all other cases, such “medium’ equilibrium may not exist. However, either a “low”
or a “high” equilibrium will exist.
• AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i, then the LHS of (25) is strictly increasing while its RHS is strictly
decreasing. Furthermore, we established earlier that, in this case, (22) must be violated.
Hence, a unique “medium” equilibrium exists if (21) is violated.
• AT−1−iT−1 < i. In this case, both the RHS and the LHS of (25) are strictly increasing.
Furthermore, we established earlier that, (21) must be violated. Hence, if (22) is also
violated, then there must be at least one “medium” equilibrium. If instead (22) holds (so
that a “low” equilibrium exists) there could still be one (or more) “medium” equilibrium.
Hence, an equilibrium always exists. If AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i, there can be either a “high” or
a “medium” equilibrium. In this case, the equilibrium is unique. If AT−1 − iT−1 < i, there
can be multiple equilibria: there can be both a low and multiple medium equilibria.
Finally, to derive the equilibrium in previous periods, I employ the same argument pre-
sented in the proof of Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the developer’s continuation utility is
equal to the utility he would get if he was to sell all his tokens in period T − 1. In previous
periods, therefore, the developer will behave as if his last period of development was T − 1.
Optimal effort and investment in period T − 1 are, again, given by (14) and (15). But
then, the equilibrium in period T − 2 when choosing QT−1 is again in mixed strategy, and is
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identical to the one derived earlier. A recursive argument implies that, in every period post-
ICO, the developer will behave as if the following period was the last period of development.
Hence, the set of equilibria is the same in every post-ICO period.
Proof of Proposition 5. Proposition 4 implies that, from period to view point, the developer’s
continuation utility is equal to the utility he would earn if he was to sell all his tokens in
period to+1 and never purchase them again. This implies that optimal effort and investment
in period to + 1 are given, again, by (9) and (10). Also here, I define
Qˆ ≡ (1− γ)M
√
2¯i,
as the minimum token holdings such that the developer will want to invest.
At ICO, the developer chooses Qto+1 (i.e., the amount of tokens not to sell) so to maximize
UT (Qto+1, Ato + (Qto −Qto+1) · pto − ito).
There are two important differences with respect to the sale of tokens on the market (consid-
ered in the proof of Proposition 4). First, here, by definition, the period-to cash constraint
is not binding, the reason being that at ICO the developer is, by definition, a net seller.
Second, when selling on the market, the developer takes as given the price of tokens (which
depends on investor’s expectations relative to his future effort). At ICO, instead, the price
of tokens is set after the developer announces how many tokens to sell. Hence, because
pto+1 = pto , then the price at which the developer can sell his tokens (either at ICO or in the
following period) reacts to the number of tokens sold.
We therefore have
UT (Qto+1, Ato + (Qto −Qto+1) · pto − ito) =


M · pto − 12
(
Qto+1
(1−γ)M
)2
+Ato − ito − i if Qto+1 ≥ Qˆ
and Ato + (M −Qto+1) · pto − iT−1 ≥ i
M
VT−1
(1−γ)M +AT−1 − iT−1 otherwise
(26)
where
pto =
Vto
(1− γ)M +
Qto+1
((1− γ)M)2 .
is the price at ICO (as well as after) in case there is positive investment and effort in period
to + 1.
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It is easy to check that the above continuation value is strictly increasing in Qto+1 as long
as the developer will be able to invest in the following period. That is, anticipating that the
amount of tokens not sold increases the price at which the developer can sell his tokens, the
developer will want to sell fewer tokens possible. The optimal Qto+1 therefore is the largest
solution to
Ato + (M −Qto+1) ·
(
Vto
(1− γ)M +
Qto+1
((1− γ)M)2
)
− iT−1 = i
If this solution is greater or equal to M if and only if Ato − iT−1 ≥ i. In this case, then
the developer will set Qto+1 = M (i.e., he will not sell any token at ICO).
If instead Ato−iT−1 < i, then the largest solution to the above equation will be lower than
M (if it exist). If it does not exist or is below Qˆ, then it is not possible to raise sufficient
funds at ICO so to able to invest in the following period. In this case, the developer is
indifferent between any Qto+1 ≤ M . If instead the largest solution to the above equation is
in [Qˆ,M ], then it will be the equilibrium.
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